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Abstract
China’s stock markets, with stringent short-sales constraints, dominance of inexperi-
enced individual investors, a small asset float and heavy share turnover (500% per year
despite a high transaction cost), provide a unique opportunity to study non-fundamental
components in stock prices. In particular, several dozen Chinese firms offered two classes
of shares: class A, which could only be held by domestic investors, and class B, which
could only be traded by foreigners. Despite their identical rights, A-share prices were
on average 420% higher than the corresponding B shares. By exploring several different
model specifications, we find that the turnover rate of A shares is able to explain a large
portion of the cross-sectional variation in A-B share premium. Our further analysis of
the relationship between asset float and share turnover shows that trading in A-share
markets is more likely to be driven by speculation than by liquidity factors. Our results
are robust after controlling for the effects of liquidity, discount rates, and differential risk
and demand curves by local and foreign investors.
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1 Introduction
Chinese stock markets provide a unique opportunity to investigate determinants of stock
prices. During the period 1993-2000, there were several dozen firms that offered two
classes of shares, class A and class B, with identical rights. Until 2001, domestic investors
could only buy A shares while foreign investors could only hold B shares. Despite their
identical payoffs, class A shares traded on average for 420% more than the corresponding
B shares. In addition, A shares turned over at a much higher rate - 500% versus 100%
per year for B shares. The striking price difference and heavy share turnover, despite the
high round trip transaction cost of 1.4%, are often attributed to speculative bubbles by
commentators. Several papers, e.g., Bailey, Chung, and Kang (1999), and Sun and Tong
(2000), had conjectured speculative trading as a possible explanation to the puzzling
behavior of the A-B share premia in China’s stock markets, but without providing an
empirical analysis that is motivated from an explicit economic mechanism.
In this paper, we examine the claim that speculative behavior is a partial explanation
for the A-B share premia. The identical payoff structure of A and B shares makes it
possible to control for stock price fundamentals. The relatively large sample allows a
formal statistical analysis of a (potential) non-fundamental component in stock prices.
The large panel also permits us to control for cross-sectional differences in risk and
liquidity, as well as the time variation of interest rates and risk premium.
Our empirical analysis is based on recent theoretical developments on speculative
bubbles. The argument that speculative motive of investors is an important determinant
of stock prices goes far back to Keynes’ General Theory. In the recent literature, Harrison
and Kreps (1978) demonstrate that asset prices may incorporate a speculative component
when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental value of a stock and
short sales are costly, since the ownership of a share of the stock provides an opportunity
to profit from other investors’ over-valuation. More recently, Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) use overconfidence, the belief by investors that their opinions are more precise than
they actually are, to derive an explicit dynamics for heterogeneous beliefs among investors
and a resulting speculative component for stock prices in a continuous-time equilibrium
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model with risk-neutral investors. Their model shows that there should be a positive
cross-sectional association between the volume of speculative trading and the size of the
non-fundamental component. Our empirical analysis is specifically built on this cross-
sectional relationship. Furthermore, Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) show that
when investors have limited risk-bearing capacity, investors’ speculative motives amplify
the effect of asset float (the amount of tradable shares) on stock prices. In particular,
they show that share turnover generated by speculative motive decreases with asset float,
which is the opposite of the predictions from theories that justify trading from liquidity
reasons. This difference allows us to distinguish speculative trading from liquidity based
trading.
Chinese stock markets are well suited for analyzing the effects of speculative trading
on stock prices for several reasons. First, not only short-sales of stocks and derivative
securities are illegal, but also equity issuance and buy-backs by firms, a common practice
that firms use to “arbitrage” the miss-valuation of their own stocks, are severely con-
strained by the restrictive rules imposed by Chinese government. Second, Chinese stock
markets were only recently re-opened in early 1990s after being closed for nearly half a
century. The markets are still in development with only limited participation of insti-
tutions, and most domestic investors are individuals who are new to stock trading and
are likely to be subject to behavioral biases, including overconfidence. Third, only 30%
of shares in Chinese stock markets are floating, much less than in other markets. The
small amount of asset float makes it particularly easy for speculative trading to generate
large price effect. These market conditions suggest that speculative trading could have
an important effect, and that it would be more likely to cause A-share prices to depart
from fundamentals than B-share prices.
Our analysis emphasizes the cross sectional correlation between the A-B share premia
and the turnover rates. We show that the A-share turnover is able to explain, on average,
20% of the monthly cross sectional variation of the A-B share premia in the period of
1994 - 2000. On the other hand, the effect of B-share turnover on the A-B premia
is insignificant. We have also incorporated the market capitalizations and various risk
measures of A shares and B shares in our analysis to control for other mechanism such
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as potentially different risks in A and B-shares returns and differential demand curves by
domestic and foreign investors. The importance of A-share turnover in explaining A-B
share premium is not substantially affected by these controls.
One might argue that the effect of A-share turnover on the A-B share premia might be
due to the cross-sectional difference in liquidity of A shares. However, the prevalence of
individual investors and the high turnover rate in A-share markets make it hard to justify
the importance of liquidity. Nevertheless, we control for the effect of liquidity using the
proportion of no-price-change days in a month for each share.1 This control actually
increases our point estimate of the effect of A-share turnover on the A-B share premia.
In addition, the effect of the portion of no-price-change days in A-shares is insignificant,
while the effect of the portion of no-price-change days in B-shares is significant. These
results suggest that the effect of A-share turnover on A-B share premium is not due to
a liquidity effect. They also point out that liquidity could have played a role in B-share
markets.
To further determine whether trading in A-share and B-share markets is driven by
speculation or liquidity reasons, we examine the cross-sectional correlation between share
turnover and asset float for both A shares and B shares. We find a negative and significant
association between share turnover and asset float in A-share markets in the period of
1994-2000, while a positive and significant relationship in B-share markets. As we argue in
Section 3, the speculative trading theory implies a negative correlation between turnover
and float. However, to attribute the A-share premium variation to differences in liquidity,
one has to postulate that, coeteris paribus, shares with higher float are less liquid!
To control for discount rate effects, we estimate several panel regressions of A-B share
premium on A-share and B-share turnovers with different specifications of time and firm
effects. We find that a model with random firm effects and a time effect is not rejected
by the data. In this model, a one standard deviation change in turnover of the A share of
a firm adds 22 percentage points to the A-B share premium. In addition, the variations
in the time effect coefficients is well explained (R2 = 85%) by a linear combination of
1This variable has been found to be an effective measure of market liquidity in U.S. stock markets and several
emerging markets by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003).
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Chinese and world interest rates and China’s political risk premium as measured in the
dollar denominated Chinese sovereign bond spread.
After February 2001, Chinese residents could purchase B shares using foreign currency.
This rule change caused a great reduction in A-B share premia. Interestingly, while A-
share markets had little reaction after the rule change, B-share prices and turnover rates
went up dramatically, indicating that speculation by domestic investors also became an
important factor in B-share markets.
Our study contributes to the growing debate on whether asset prices can be affected
by investor psychology or other non-fundamental factors. While the classic asset pricing
models typically state that stock prices are determined by firm fundamentals, i.e., the
future stream of dividends and the discount factors that apply, this view has been espe-
cially challenged by the rise and fall of Internet stocks in the late 1990s.2 Many observers
have suggested that the speculative trading induced by the heterogeneous beliefs among
investors about the fundamental value of these stocks has played an important role in
the price dynamics of these Internet stocks. However, it is difficult to use the Internet
stock prices to examine such a view because it is difficult to measure the fundamental
value of a stock. The pairs of A and B shares in China’s stock markets provide a unique
and natural setup to control for asset fundamentals, and our results support the view
that speculative motive of investors can be an important determinant of stock prices.
Our analysis adds to the earlier studies that use the relative pricing between securities
with identical or similar fundamentals to analyze the effects of investor sentiments on
asset prices. For example, Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) study the discounts of closed
funds relative to their net asset values, and Froot and Dabora (1999) examine three
examples of twin shares, including Royal Dutch and Shell, that are traded in different
markets across the world. While these studies find evidence that asset prices are affected
by investor sentiments and location of trade, it is difficult to disentangle the interaction
between individual investors and arbitrageurs and other institutional complications in
these markets. China’s stock markets provide a relatively simple environment, given
2For example, several recent studies, e.g. Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003),
and Ofek and Richardson (2003), show that in some extreme carve-out examples the value of a firm can be less
than its subsidiary.
4
the strictly enforced restrictions on short-sales, segmentation of A and B shares, under-
development of investment institutions, and lack of derivatives markets. These market
conditions allow us to specifically identify speculative trading by individual investors as
an important determinant of stock prices.
Our study also contributes to the market segmentation literature in international fi-
nance. Previous studies, such as Eun and Janakiramana (1986), Hietala (1989), Bailey
and Jagtiani (1994), and Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) have used capital controls, infor-
mation asymmetries, corporate governance, liquidity, as well as price discrimination to
explain the price difference between foreign and domestic shares. Our analysis indicates
that speculative trading could also provide a mechanism to generate this price difference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
related studies on the prices of China’s A and B shares. Section 3 describes a theory of
speculative trading and its implication on stock prices, based on heterogeneous beliefs
and short-sales constraints. In Section 4, we describe some basic facts of the Chinese
stock markets. In Section 5, we analyze the A-B share premium and other variables
related to speculative trading. Section 6 provides panel regressions to examine the rela-
tionship between A-B share premium and share turnover. Section 7 discusses the changes
that occurred after the relaxation of trading restrictions in B-share markets. Section 8
concludes the paper with some further discussion of the challenge created by speculative
prices on the development of stock markets.
2 Related Studies
Various arguments have been proposed in the international finance literature to explain
the difference in prices between different classes of shares, including differential discount
rates and risk factors, differential demand curves, asymmetry of information, and liquidity
effect3. These arguments have been applied to understand the A-B share premium after
it was documented by Bailey (1994). In this section, we briefly review these arguments.
Fernald and Rogers (2002) and Eun, Janakiramanan and Lee (2002) propose that
3The possibility of differential tax effect is ruled out since there is no tax on dividends nor on capital gains
for both A and B shares.
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the A-B share premium may be caused by the difference in discount factors for the A
and B shares, since Chinese local investors and foreign investors face different investment
opportunity sets and have different risk exposure. The difference in discount factors may
come from difference in risk-free rates or from difference in risk premium.
Domestic investors and foreign investors may also have different demand elasticities for
a company’s shares, as suggested by Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995). Sun and Tong (2000)
adopt this argument to explain the price discount of B-shares relative to A-shares. The
differential demand curves are potentially related to the information asymmetry between
local investors and foreign investors. Chakravarty, Sarkar, and Wu (1998) emphasize
that foreigners need to bear more risks in B shares relative to local investors in A shares
due to language barriers and different accounting standards. However, the empirical
evidence seems to be mixed on whether local or foreign investors are more informed.
Chui and Kwok (1998) and Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) find evidence that B-share returns
lead A-share returns by examining the cross-autocorrelation between them, while Chan,
Menkveld and Yang (2003) show evidence supporting better informed domestic investors.
We take into account these arguments by incorporating the prevailing interest rates in
China and abroad, the political risk of China, the market risk and firm specific risk of both
A and B shares, and the market capitalization of both A and B shares in our analysis. We
confirm the importance of these effects, but show that the effect of speculative trading
on A-B share premia is not affected by these controls.
Chen, Lee and Rui (2001), and Chen and Xiong (2002) argued that liquidity may
explain part of the Chinese A-B share price difference. As we mentioned above, we use
the proportion of no-price-change days as a proxy for liquidity and found that it does
not change the effect of A-share turnover on the premium. Furthermore our results
concerning the effect of asset float on turnover provide supporting evidence that trading
in A-shares is more likely to be driven by speculation than by liquidity reasons.
Karolyi and Li (2003) and Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2003) also analyze the effects
of the opening B shares to domestic investors in 2001 on the price difference between
A and B shares. Karolyi and Li find that strong reactions are concentrated in small
capitalization stocks and those with substantial past-return momentum and are unrelated
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to firm risk and liquidity attributes. Chan, Menkveld and Yang find that the change in
price is partially caused by the reduction in the information asymmetry between foreign
and domestic investors.
3 Theory on Speculative Trading and Asset Prices
A long tradition in economics and finance, going back at least to Keynes (1931) and
Williams (1938), stresses the role of speculative behavior on asset prices. Recent refer-
ences include Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003),
and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). These papers show that when investors have
heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a stock and short sales are costly, the ownership of
a share of the stock provides a resale option to profit from other investors’ over-valuation.
The resale option thus contributes a speculative component to stock prices, in addition
to the fundamental value that is determined by the expected future cashflow discounted
by a risk adjusted discount rate. In this section, we briefly discuss the implications of
these models on speculative trading and asset prices.
Standard asset pricing models usually assume that investors have homogenous beliefs
about the economy, and focus on the risk premium that investors would demand for
bearing risk. In reality, investors often differ in their beliefs about asset fundamentals,
for example, fund managers and financial analysts sometimes offer dramatically different
views in newspapers and TVs about the future perspectives of the economy or certain
sectors. The fluctuation in the relative beliefs among investors naturally leads to trad-
ing, which has been considered by some researchers, such as Harris and Raviv (1993) and
Odean (1998), as an important mechanism in understanding trading in financial markets.
Heterogeneous beliefs can be generated at least from two possible sources: heterogeneous
prior beliefs or psychological biases in investors’ information processing. Morris (1996)
argues that the common prior assumption, which has been widely used in game theory
and asset pricing models, is not motivated from any economic principle, but it is rather
a simplifying tool to model agents’ beliefs. Therefore, it is legitimate to relax this as-
sumption, provided that a plausible mechanism is used to parameterize the difference in
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beliefs.4
Investor overconfidence provides a convenient way to generate heterogeneous beliefs
among investors. Overconfidence is a widely observed behavioral bias in psychological
studies. Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) review the related psycholog-
ical evidence and discuss implications of overconfidence to financial markets. Overconfi-
dence can lead investors to differ in their information processing, i.e., some investors might
choose to overweigh a subset of available information in analyzing asset fundamentals,
while other investors might overweigh another set, therefore generating heterogeneous
beliefs. The difference in investors’ beliefs will fluctuate more if investors are more over-
confident and differ more in their information processing, or if there is more fundamental
uncertainty which would leave more room for beliefs to differ.
When short-sales of assets are costly, heterogeneous beliefs can create a speculative
motive for investors. An asset owner expects not only to collect future cash flows from
the asset, but also to profit from other investors’ over-optimism in the future by sell-
ing the share at a price higher than he thinks it is worth. Thus, the price of an asset
can be decomposed in two components: the fundamental valuation of the asset owner
if forced to hold the asset forever and collect all the future cashflows, and a speculative
component generated by the asset owner’s option to sell the share for a speculative profit.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) offer a continuous-time model with overconfident and risk
neutral investors to analyze the contribution of the resale option to asset prices and the
optimal selling strategy of asset owners. They show that the resale option, analogous
to standard financial options with the difference in investors’ beliefs as the underlying
asset, is valuable to the asset owner even if other investors’ beliefs are currently lower.
In particular, the valuation of the resale option depends crucially on the volatility of the
difference in beliefs, which increases with investor overconfidence and the fundamental
volatility of the asset. As the difference in investors’ beliefs become more volatile, the re-
sale option becomes more valuable, and at the same time investors trade more frequently
with each other. Hence we would predict that when investors have heterogeneous beliefs
4It is important to note that private information cannot generate heterogeneous beliefs that lead rational
investors with identical prior beliefs to speculate against each other. See Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Tirole
(1982), and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987).
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about asset fundamental and short-sales are constrained the following hypothesis would
hold:
Hypothesis I: There is a positive relationship between the speculative component in
asset prices and the turnover of shares.
We will use the pairs of A- and B-shares in China’s stock markets to study the
speculative component in prices, and especially to examine its relation with turnover of
shares, as highlighted in Hypothesis I. Interestingly, Cochrane (2002) also pointed out the
existence of a positive cross-sectional correlation between the market/book ratio of US
stocks and their turnover rates during the Internet bubble period of 1996-2000. However,
he does not provide a formal analysis of this empirical regularity.
Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) analyze the effects of asset float, i.e., the number
of shares that are available for trading in the market, on the resale option and specu-
lative trading. When investors are risk averse, a larger asset float means that it takes
a greater divergence in opinion in the future for an asset owner to resell the shares for
a speculative profit, which implies that the resale option is less valuable today. Indeed,
Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong show that, as the asset float increases, the “strike price”
of the resale option increases. As a result, the resale option becomes less valuable, and
the share turnover rate becomes smaller since asset owners are less likely to exercise their
resale option. Since the effect of asset float on the resale option derives from the the
strike price, it is highly non-linear, and especially dramatic when the float is small. The
theory in Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) has the following implication:
Hypothesis II: The speculative component and the turnover of shares decrease with
asset float. The speculative component is especially sensitive to changes in asset float
when float is small.
Another factor in studying the relation between asset prices and share turnover is
liquidity. Investors often need to trade assets for portfolio rebalancing or other liquidity
reasons, and assets differ in transaction cost and the level of difficulty in matching buyers
with sellers. Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2003), Vayanos and Wang (2003) and Weill
(2003) provide theoretical models to analyze the effects of liquidity on asset prices and
trading volume, based on a search process between buyers and sellers. It is intuitive
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that liquid assets tend to have higher prices and larger turnover rates. These models
also predict that share turnover is positively related to asset float when investors trade
for liquidity reasons, distinct from the prediction in Hypothesis II. The basic argument
is that when asset float becomes larger, it is easier for a seller to match with a buyer.
Hence a liquidity story implies:
Hypothesis III: The turnover rate of shares increases with asset float.
The opposite predictions in Hypotheses II and III on the effect of asset float on
share turnover allow us to separate trading driven by speculation from trading driven by
liquidity reasons.
4 The Chinese Stock Market
4.1 Institutions
China made a dramatic transition from a planned economy to a market economy, starting
in 1978. In 1990, stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen. These
stock exchanges listed shares of partially privatized state owned enterprises. Market
growth was spectacular - by 2001 each exchange listed more than 500 companies and the
total market cap of Chinese stocks exceeded US$500 billion. The number of shareholders
increased 160 times, from 400,000 in 1991 to more than 64 million in 2001.
Like other emerging markets, China displayed remarkable booms and busts. Figure 1
illustrates the behavior of the Shanghai A share and B share indices. Beginning in 1991,
the Shanghai index went from 100 to 250 in less than a year and then reached 1200 by
the first quarter of 1992. By mid-1992, multiples of 50 to 100 times earnings became
the norm on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and some “hot” issues fetched even higher
multiples.5 Starting in June 1992, the Shanghai stock market dropped by more than 60
percent in a period of five months. Within a few days of hitting bottom, the bull market
returned. In just three months, the overall market index rose from 400 to a new height
5As an example, Happy Flying, a consumer electronics company, sold for over 1,000 times its previous year’s
earnings at one point. Apparently investors believed that the earnings of Happy Flying would rise astronomically
as a result of equipping 1.2 billion consumers with TVs and VCRs, and quickly bring the price-earnings ratio
to a more reasonable level. When the market fell, Happy Flying not only led the way but also crashed more
spectacularly than any other stock, dropping from 13.10 Yuan to 2.60 Yuan. See Malkiel and Mei (1997) for
more details.
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of 1600. However, by the mid 1994 the index was back to 400. In the second half of the
decade the market generally trended up, but as it can be seen from the figure, there were
numerous episodes in which the index lost several hundred points in a short period. For
example, during the 1993-2001 period, there were 20 “mini-crashes” when the Shanghai
market Index lost more than 10% in a month, but only 8 similar episodes in the Nasdaq.
In addition to high volatility, the Chinese stock market had very high turnover. From
1991 to 2001, class A shares turned over on average at an annual rate of 500%, which
is even higher than the 365% turnover of DotCom firms in their heyday, and more than
five times the turnover rate of the typical NYSE stock.6
The heavy turnover rate of A shares is puzzling from the perspective of standard
rational expectations models of asset trading, especially given the high transactions cost
in Chinese stock markets. During most 1990s, each side of a trade on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange had to pay a 0.4% commission fee to the broker and a 0.3% stamp tax
to the government.7 Thus, a trade would incur a total fee of 1.4% of the proceeds, in
addition to other costs such as the price impact of trades. A turnover rate of 500% a
year implies that 7% of the A-share market capitalization was paid as direct trading fees
each year. This number is hard to justify from the usual hedging or portfolio rebalancing
arguments.8
There are several features of the Chinese market during this period that make the
model in Section 3 above particularly applicable.
Chinese residents face a very stringent “short-sale” constraint. Chinese investors’
accounts are kept centrally at the stock exchanges, and it is illegal to sell short. An
exchange’s computer always check an investor’s position before it executes a trade. This
trading system makes it very difficult for financial institutions to lend stocks to their
clients for short selling purposes. Moreover, there are no futures or option markets on
6Ofek and Richardson (2001).
7See the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange: http://www.sse.com.cn.
8The trading activity in the Chinese markets is much heavier than the neighboring markets. For example, the
average turnover rates in 1994 and 1995 for Indonesia, Japan, and Korea are 23%, 24%, and 125%, respectively,
according to Morgan Stanley International Portfolio Desk, IFC Stock Market Factbook (1996) and Dow Jones
Research. The direct transaction costs per round-trip trade for Indonesia, Japan, and Korea are 1.6%, 0.7%,
and 1.3%, respectively, comparable to China.
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stocks in China.9
Normally, when equity prices exceed their fundamental values, companies will increase
the supply of equities to arbitrage the difference. Baker andWurgler (2002) present strong
evidence of market timing by U.S. firms, showing that firms tend to issue equity when
their market value is high. This automatic market correction mechanism is impaired in
China because of the tight government control over IPOs and seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs). Chinese companies need government approval to sell their equity. The process
is highly political and companies often have to wait years for issuing shares. Strict
quotas, which generally bind, stop many qualifying companies from taking advantage
of favorable market conditions to sell their shares. Similarly, when equity prices falls
below their fundamental values, companies are also prevented from share buy-backs due
to restrictive Chinese corporate law.10
The Chinese stock market only resumed its operation in early 1990s after being shut
down for nearly half a century. At the moment, it is dominated by individual investors.
Investment institutions such as mutual funds and pension funds are still in an early stage
of development. According to a recent report of the World Bank “at the end of 1999,
of the 30 percent of tradable shares, individuals held 25 percent and institutions held
5 percent” (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort (2002), page 77). Feng and Seasholes (2003)
summarize the demographic information of a sample of 90,478 actively investing indi-
viduals in China, and find that these individuals are much younger, and would have
less investing/trading experience in comparison with a typical individual investor in U.S.
Psychological experiments indicate that overconfidence is more pronounced in the face
of more difficult tasks.11 Therefore, it seems a reasonable working hypothesis to assume
9The government banned bond futures market in 1994 because of a price manipulation scandal and has also
put the development of equity derivatives markets on hold. So far, no equity derivatives have be legally traded
in China due to a lack of government approval.
10It is worth noting that, while Chinese firms had almost no control over its IPO or SEO process, the Chinese
government does tend to issue more shares in a booming market. However, the issuance is often based on a long
waiting list whose order seems to be more related to politics than to relative valuations in the market place.
As a result, while the new issues approved by the government may take advantage of overall market conditions,
they are not meant to address relative mis-valuations in the marketplace. As late as 2002, a World Bank Report
states ”...future decisions about which companies will access the market and when and where they will do so will
be based on market principles.” (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort (2002), page 111, the emphasis is ours.)
11See Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982).
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that Chinese investors were more likely to display overconfidence, especially relative to
the foreign institutional investors who invest in the Chinese B-share markets. Given the
presence of strict short-sales constraints and less experienced individual investors, the
mechanism described in Section 3 seems well suited for Chinese A-share markets, and we
proceed to test its implications.
The float (tradable shares) in Chinese stock markets is small. Since the government
is still in the process of gradually privatizing state owned enterprises, it has a dominant
ownership in most public companies. Chinese companies have four major types of shares,
state shares, legal person shares, A shares and B shares.12 The state shares and legal
person shares, each contributing to about one third of all shares, are not tradable and
are usually owned directly by the central and local governments or indirectly through
domestic institutions, most of which are partially owned by the government. As we
argue in Section 3 the small amount of float makes it easy for speculative trading among
overconfident investors to generate a large price effect.
4.2 A-B Share Premium
Several dozen Chinese companies issued two classes of common shares with identical
voting and dividend rights. They are also listed on the same exchanges, either on the
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. Class A shares were restricted to domestic res-
idents. Class B shares were confined to foreigners before February 2001 when domestic
residents were allowed to purchase B shares using foreign currency. Even after the rule
change, capital controls continue to serve as a restriction for Chinese residents to acquire
B shares. In the period 1993-2001, 75 companies had both class A and class B shares.
Our sample covers prices and other characteristics for all firms that listed both A and
B shares from 1993-2001. To provide some general description of speculative behavior in
the Chinese market, we also collected data for the much larger set of all companies that
listed A shares, though typically not B shares, during the period of 1997-2001. The data
include daily closing prices, monthly returns (with dividend reinvested), annual dividends
12See Sun and Tong (2003) for a detailed account of these shares.
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and earnings per share, turnover, and the number of floating A shares.13 Our sample
period of 1993 to 2001 covers the market slump from 1993-1995, a major bull market in
1996-1997 and a tech stock boom from 1999-2001 that coincides with the tech bubble in
the U.S. There is also the important regime change in February 2001, when the Chinese
government changed the regulations on B-shares, allowing domestic investors to legally
own and trade them if they have foreign currency.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics. Since our sample period overlaps with
the U.S. tech bubble, we split our sample into two groups: High tech firms and the rest
(called low-tech). We classify firms that belong to the information technology, biotech,
telecom, and computers sectors as high-tech companies.14 For A shares, we find that the
high-tech firms are generally larger in market capitalization, have higher prices, and tend
to trade more heavily. Monthly turnover was 43% for the high-tech firms and 39% for
the low-tech firm, which are equivalent to annual rates of 516% and 468% respectively.
However, the difference in behavior between Chinese high-tech and low-tech firms is much
smaller than in the case of U.S. Internet stocks (See Ofek and Richardson (2003).) For
this reason we will not differentiate between the two types of firms in what follows.
Table 2 provides some simple comparison between A and B shares. The comparison
is based on matching A and B shares of the same companies in the sample. While there
were about 1250 firms on the two exchanges, only 75 firms issued both A and B shares.
It is worth noting that the issuance of both shares are usually not determined by the
firm, but by central government policies. A shares were also more actively traded than
B shares. The average turnover of A shares was four times that of B shares during the
sample period. There was also more cross-sectional variation of turnover in A shares than
in B shares. The average cross-sectional variation of monthly turnover in A shares was
18.5% compared to 5.3% for B shares. Figure 3 plots both the time series of the average
and cross-sectional variation of the monthly turnover rates of both A and B shares. In
13The data are obtained from Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Inc., which has recently reached an
cooperative agreement with Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) to incorporate GTA research databases
on China’s security markets into the WRDS. We have also confirmed part of our data from GTA with the data
that we received from another source, Boshi Fund Management Company.
14We classified G (info tech including telecom and computer), C5, C51, C5110, C5115 (electronics), C85,
C8501, C8599 (biotech, pharmaceutics), L20, L2001, L2005, L2099 (information services) as high tech, and all
others as low tech.
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addition, we provide summary information on the proportion of no-price-change days, a
measure of market liquidity which we will discuss in greater detail in Section 5.2.
Table 2 also provides some simple statistics on the A-share price premium over the cor-
responding B share. On average, A shares fetched a 421.8% premium over B shares, even
though they were entitled to exactly the same legal rights and claim to dividends.15 The
presence of such a large domestic share premium is quite different from many emerging
and developed markets where domestic shares generally sell at a discount. Hietala (1989),
Bailey and Jagtiani (1994), Bailey, Chung, and Kang (1999) and Stulz and Wasserfallen
(1993) have all found a price discount for domestic shares in Finland, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand.16 These authors have used liquid-
ity factors, supply and demand factors to explain the discount. Some have even argued
for a role for speculation without however conducting an empirical analysis.
Figure 2 presents a graphic plot of the equally weighted average A shares premium
over time. The premium rose from 300% in April 1993 to about 800% in March 1999
and then fell to 100% at the end of 2001. The relaxation of restrictions on purchase
of B shares by domestic investors in February 2001 did not eliminate all premia and it
remained at a level around 80%, since domestic Chinese investors have limited access to
the necessary foreign currency.17 Figure 2 also provides the number of firms used in our
study of A-B premia. This number changes over time because of listings and de-listings,
and grows from less than 10 to over 70 in the sample period.
In addition to their large magnitude, the A-B share premia also vary dramatically
15Since B shares were traded in dollars and A shares in Yuans, the difference depends on the exchange rate.
We used the official rate of the Bank of China. A black market rate would lower the average premium, but would
not affect the cross sectional results that we emphasize.
16Typically in these countries a class of restricted shares are offered to local investors only, and another class
of unrestricted shares are offered to both local and foreign investors. The restricted local shares usually sell at a
discount. However, both China’s A and B shares are restricted shares especially before the B shares were opened
to local investors in 2001. Even after 2001, Chinese capital controls still imposed restrictions on the ownership of
B shares by residents. Thus, the finding of restricted shares traded at a discount relative to unrestricted shares
in other countries may not be directly comparable with the China’s A-B share premia.
17Until a few years ago, China’s currency control was quite strict. The only sources of foreign currency for
domestic investors are remittance from overseas or the black market. To open a B-share account, domestic
investors need to bring copies of foreign passports to show that the account is actually intended for foreigners.
Recently, the government has somewhat relaxed its currency control, allowing people to exchange limited amount
of foreign currency for overseas travel. It is also possible to exchange large amount of foreign currency in Hong
Kong.
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across firms. The average (over time) cross-sectional standard deviation of the premia
is 167%. This compares with a (time-series) standard deviation of the average monthly
premium of 193% during the same period. Hence cross sectional variation is of the same
magnitude as the time series variation of the premium. Figure 4 plots the cross-sectional
standard deviation of price premia over time. It fluctuates from 50% to over 400%. In
the empirical analysis that follows, we focus on explaining this cross-sectional variation
of the premia.
5 Empirical Analysis
One of the main hurdles to examining speculative components in stock prices is that
deviations from fundamental value are unobservable. The presence of the two classes of
shares of Chinese stocks with identical voting and dividend rights and a substantial price
difference suggests the possibility of a non-fundamental component in the price of the
more expensive class. Of course, some of this premium could result from other factors
such as discount rates, risk premia, and market liquidity. In this section, we analyze
the cross-sectional association between the A-B share premium, share turnover rate, and
asset float based on the theory introduced in Section 3. We will also control for the cross-
sectional effects generated by firms’ risk, liquidity, and market capitalization. In the next
section, we will use a panel regression method to control for the effect of time-varying
discount rate and political risk.
5.1 Speculative Trading and Cross-sectional Variation of A-B Share Premia
Could the existence of a speculative component help explain the large variation of premia
on A shares? In this section, we propose a regression analysis to test this view. According
to the theory described in Section 3, the A-share price of a firm (the i-th firm), PAi ,
can be decomposed as the sum of two components, a fundamental component and a
speculative component. The fundamental component is the current expected value of
discounted future dividends adjusted for risk premium and we assume, in analogy to
Gordon’s Growth Formula, that it can be written as Ei
RAit−gi
, where Ei is the expectation
of current (unobservable) earnings, gi its growth rate and R
A
it the discount rate that
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applies.
RAit = rChina,t + µ
A
i
where rChina,t is the domestic interest rate available to Chinese investors and µ
A
i is the
risk premium which could be determined by the firm’s market risk or idiosyncratic risk.
The speculative component SAit is determined by the volatility of the difference in beliefs
among the Chinese investors about the firm’s fundamental value and by the float of the











where SBit is the speculative component in the B-share market. This speculative com-
ponent in B-shares is positive when foreign investors are also overconfident and have
heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental value of the firm. In this case, SBit depends
on the volatility of he difference in beliefs among the foreign investors, and on the float
of B-shares. The discount rate RBit is given by
RBit = rWorld,t + β
B
i µWorld + λp,
with rWorld,t as the world interest rate, β
B
i as the beta of the firm’s B share, µWorld as
the world market premium and λp as the sovereign risk premium associated with China.
For simplicity, we will assume first that the B-share price provides a reasonable mea-
sure of the fundamental component of the firm value, that is SBit = 0. Later we will treat
















start with this simplification, although we will bring back later the term involving the
difference in discount rates.
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Hypothesis 1 in Section 3 claims that, as the volatility of the difference in beliefs of
the domestic investors who trade a firm’s A shares changes, the speculative component
SAit and the turnover rate of A shares co-move together,
18 thus predicting a positive
association between the A-B share premium and the A-share turnover rate.
To examine this correlation, we run the following cross-sectional regression of A-B
premia on turnover rates:19









it = log(1 + turnover
B
it ). Here, we expect the
coefficient c1t to be positive. We incorporate the turnover of B shares in the regression,
since it is possible that a speculative component may also exist in B shares (SBit > 0).
If this is the case, we expect a positive relationship between SBit and τ
B
it since both are
generated by heterogeneous beliefs among the foreign investors who trade the firm’s B
shares, and the coefficient c2t should be negative. Another explanation for A-B share
premium is a liquidity discount for B shares, since B shares, which have much less active
trading than A-shares, might be illiquid. If so, we expect that firms with smaller B share
turnover would have a bigger price discount in B shares and a higher A-B share premium.
Thus, the B share illiquidity argument would also imply a negative coefficient c2t.
The results of this regression are reported in Panel A of Table 3.20 In the period
that precedes the liberalization of B-shares trading to domestic investors and that is
covered by our data, April 1993 to December 2000, A and B share turnover explain on
average 25% of the cross-sectional variation in A-B share premium. The average c1t, the
coefficient on A-share turnover, is positive and highly significant with a Fama-MacBeth
18There are several reasons why the volatility of the difference in investors’ beliefs would vary across stocks.
First, since the A-share markets are dominated by individual investors, each stock is likely to have a different
investor bases at a given point of time. Second, individuals could display different overconfidence degrees with
respect to information related to individual stocks. Finally assets may also differ in the amount of fundamental
uncertainty that creates room for investors’ beliefs to diverge.
19We could also run a time-series regression. However, given the persistence in turnover data and the well
known difficulty of removing the persistence, (see Lo and Wang (2000)), our study will focus on explaining the
cross-sectional variation of A-B share premia.
20During the period of 1997-2000, the first day returns for Chinese IPO averaged 211% in high-tech industries
and 141% in other industries. For this reason we exclude from our data set observations that correspond to the
first twelve months after an IPO.
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t- statistics of 8.3,21 and A-share turnover explains 20% of the cross sectional variation
of the premium. A 5% increase in A-share turnover is associated with an increase in
excess of 15% of a stock’s A-B premium. The coefficient of B-share turnover, c2t, is not
statistically significant.
Several other studies, e.g. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) and Eun, Janakiramanan, and
Lee (2001), have attempted to use the share turnover to explain the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the A-B share premia. Their specification of the cross-sectional regression of the
A-B share premia is different from ours in that they all use the ratio between A share
turnover and B share turnover as an independent variable, while we use the A share
turnover and B share turnover as separate variables. Chen, Lee and Rui find a positive
and statistically significant coefficient for the turnover ratio, but the R2 of the regression
is small. Furthermore, Eun, Janakiramanan, and Lee show that the coefficient of the
turnover ratio becomes insignificant when some other control variables, such as betas of
A and B shares and the volatility of A share return, are included in the regression. Since
our point estimates for A share turnover and B share turnover are both positive (see
Table 3), combining them in a ratio could result in a statistically insignificant estimate.
Indeed, when we use our data and repeat the regressions of Eun, Janakiramanan, and
Lee (2001), our estimates are similar to theirs.22
The positive cross-sectional correlation between the A-B share premia and A-share
turnover is also consistent with the experience of U.S. stock markets in the internet
“bubble” period 1996-2000. Cochrane (2002) documents a cross-sectional correlation
between log market-to-book ratio and log turnover rate for U.S. stocks during this period.
Thus, while China is an emerging market, its stock price behavior seems similar to that
of other more developed markets.
5.2 Controlling for Illiquidity
Liquidity is an important factor in explaining cross-sectional differences in stock prices
and stock returns, for example, see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Pastor and Stam-
21The Fama-McBeth t-statistics are computed by multiplying the square root of the number of time periods
minus one by the ratio between the time series mean and the standard deviation of the parameter estimates.
22The exact results are available upon request.
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baugh (2003) for U.S. stock prices and returns, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003)
for emerging market stock returns, and Chen and Xiong (2002), and Chen, Lee, and Rui
(2001) for Chinese stock prices. The basic argument for liquidity is that investors incur
larger transaction costs when trading illiquid stocks, and therefore have less willingness
to pay for these stocks.
In the case of China’s A-share markets, illiquidity is unlikely to explain much of the the
cross-sectional variation of A-share prices. As we discussed earlier, A-share markets are
dominated by individual investors who trade heavily. Domestic investment institutions
such as mutual funds and pension funds are not fully developed yet. The observed
turnover and the likely demand by these individual investors indicate that illiquidity is
not a problem. On the other hand foreign institutions invest in Chinese stocks, but only
through the listings in Hong Kong stock markets or through Chinese B-share markets.
Liquidity might be a problem for institutional investors in the B-share markets. We will
further examine whether the trading in A-share and B-share markets is generated by
speculation or liquidity reasons in Section 5.3.
In order to control for the effects of illiquidity in the A-B share premia, we use the
proportion of no-price-change days of a stock over a month as a measure of liquidity.
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) used this variable to measure liquidity for NYSE
stocks, and found that it is highly correlated with other liquidity estimators such as
quoted bid-ask spread and Roll’s measure of the effective spread. Recently, Bekaert, Har-
vey, and Lundblad (2003) suggested that this measure is particularly useful in emerging
markets where direct measures of trading cost such as bid-ask spreads are usually not
available. They found that the fraction of no-price-change days is significant in explain-
ing expected stock returns using data of 19 developing countries (China not included).
On the other hand, they also found that share turnover rates are insignificant.
We obtained daily return data for the period 1995-2001. Table 2 shows that A shares
averaged only 2.1% of trading days with no price changes in this period, while the cor-
responding B shares averaged 14.3%. This suggests that B shares are more illiquid than
A shares. Figures 5A and 5B plot the time series of the average and cross-sectional
variation of the percentage of no-price-change dates in a month for both A shares and
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B shares. They show that B shares have not only more no-price-change dates, but also
more cross-sectional variation in no-price-change dates.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the cross-sectional regression of A-B share premium on
the turnover rates of A-shares and B-shares, and the corresponding proportion of no-
price-change days, denoted by zAit and z
B
it , for the period 1995-2000 that precedes the
liberalization of B-shares. A comparison with Panel A shows that using our control for
liquidity does not change much the coefficients of A-share and B-share turnover rates. If
anything, the point estimate of the effect of A-share turnover goes up, while that of B
shares is still not significant. This indicates that the effects of turnover rates of the A
shares on A-B share premium does not result from the demand for liquidity.
The proportion of no-price-change days of B shares has a significant and positive
effect on the A-B share premium. It is consistent with the results in Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2003) for other emerging markets. The proportion of no-price-change days
in A-shares is not statistically significant for the determination of the A-B premia. This
is consistent with our earlier argument that liquidity in A markets has a smaller effect
than in B markets. Panel C provides similar results by regressing A-B share premium
on zAit and z
B
it only. Dropping the turnover variables does not change much the point
estimates of the no-trade days coefficient.
5.3 Effects of Asset Float on Turnover
To further differentiate the effects of speculative trading and liquidity factors, we examine
the relation between the turnover rate of shares and asset float in both A-share markets
and B-share markets. The theories summarized in Section 3 suggest that when investors
are risk averse and trade for speculative reasons, the turnover rate of the asset’s share
decreases with the float of the asset. On the other hand, share turnover is positively
related to asset float if investors trade for liquidity reasons.23
23A positive correlation between share turnover and asset float is supported by empirical analysis on liquidity
trading. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) attribute the difference in the liquidity between on-the-run
treasury bonds and off-the-run bonds to the holding of off-the-run bonds by entities such as insurance companies
that typically do not trade. Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) provide evidence of a positive link
between firm size, liquidity and turnover in US stocks. Chan, Chan and Fong (2002) provide evidence that a
reduction in asset float may suppress liquidity and asset trading.
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To investigate the effect of float on A-share turnover, we run the following cross-
sectional regression:
τAit = α0t + α1t log(MarketCap
A
i,t).
The results are shown in Table 4 for the period April 1993 to December 2000. Panel
A shows that a firm’s A-share turnover decreases with its own market capitalization as
suggested by our model and the coefficient is highly significant. The same regression is
conducted for B-share turnover and is reported in Panel B. It indicates that, in the same
period, a firm’s B-share turnover increases with its own market capitalization, and that
the coefficient is also highly significant. The positive relation between B-share turnover
and B-share capitalization is consistent with a liquidity story, as opposed to a speculative
trading theory. B shares are usually less liquid than A shares. When a firm’s B-share float
becomes larger, more foreign investors (especially foreign institutions) will be interested
in trading in this share, and liquidity improves. As a result, shares are turned over faster.
The different nature of A-share and B-share turnovers is consistent with our earlier result
that speculative trading is important for A-share prices but liquidity is important for B-
share prices.
5.4 Other Determinants of A-B Share Premia
Besides speculation and liquidity, the A-B share premia could also be driven by differential
demand curves of domestic and foreign investors, or difference in the risk of A and
B shares. To control for these effects, we incorporate the asset float and various risk
measures of both A-shares and B-shares into the cross-sectional regression:




it + c3t log(MarketCap
A
1,t) + c4t log(MarketCap
B
i,t)
+c5tCov(RBi, RF ) + c6tCov(RBi, RB) + c7tCov(RAi, RC) + c8tV ar(RAi). (3)
We use the same risk measures as Eun, Janakiramanan, and Lee (2001). The covariances
of a firm’s B share returns with the Morgan Stanley world return index, RF , and China’s
B-share return index, RB, are measures of risk in B-share markets. We measure sys-
tematic risk and firm specific risk in A-share markets by the covariance between a firm’s
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A-share returns and China’s A-share return index, Cov(RAi, RC), and the variance of the
firm’s A-share returns, V ar(RAi).
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The regression results are reported in Table 5 for the period April 1993 to December
2000. In the first set of regressions, we only add the market capitalization of A and B
shares. The market capitalization of A shares has a negative and highly significant effect
on A-B share premium, consistent with the hypothesis that more floating A shares of
a firm lead to a lower price. The market capitalization of B shares also has a negative
and highly significant effect on A-B share premium. Since B-share price appears in the
denominator of the premium, a negative coefficient implies that more floating B shares
lead to a higher B-share prices, consistent with the liquidity story that we discuss in
Section 3. More importantly, A-share turnover is still highly significant with a t-stat of
6.31, and it explains 13% of the cross-sectional variations in A-B share premium. Figure
4 illustrates how the time series variation of the (cross-sectional) standard deviation of
the premia is explained by the turnover rates and market capitalizations of A and B
shares.
The second set of results in Table 5 reports the effects of measures of risk in A-share
and B-share returns. The inclusion of the four risk measures does not affect much the
coefficients and significance of A-share and B-share turnover rates. Furthermore, the
impact of a one standard deviation of A-share asset float is at least seven times the
impact of a one standard deviation of any of the four risk measures, while that of B
shares is at least five times.
6 Panel Regressions
In the cross-sectional regressions of the previous section, we have not fully accounted for
the effect of the discount rates for A and B shares, which are different across firms and
change over time. To further account for this effect, we use a panel regression approach
to include firm effects and time effects. To conserve degrees of freedom, the following
24We also replaced log(MarketCap) with log(shares outstanding) and the results are quite similar.
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parsimonious form is employed by imposing constant c1t and c2t:




it + it. (4)
The terms ui and c0t come from linearizing the term
RBit−gi
RAit−gi
in equation (1). The firm
effect term ui deals with the effects caused by the cross-sectional differences in the firm’s
growth rate, such as liquidity or other risk factors that we have considered in the previous
section. The time effect term c0t summarizes time-series variables, such as the Chinese
interest rate, the world interest rate, equity premiums, and the risk premium associated
with China’s political risk.
In Table 6, specification I (time effects and firm effects) allows both effects. Specifi-
cation II (time effects and random firm effects) allows time effects as well as firm hetero-
geneity but assumes the firm effects are uncorrelated cross-sectionally. This assumption
allows us to treat the firm effects as random errors so that we can avoid explicitly estimat-
ing them in order to save degrees of freedom. Specification III (firm effects and random
time effects) allows firm effects as well as time effects but assumes the time effects c0t
have no serial correlation. This assumption also allows us to treat the time effects as
random errors to save degrees of freedom. Specification IV (time effects only) only allows
time effects. Specification V (firm effects only) only allows firm effects.
Table 6 gives the estimates for the different model specifications as well as results for
the specification tests for the 1993-2000 period. In our estimation process, we have used
both balanced panel (stocks that have no missing observation during the sample period)
and unbalanced panel (all stocks during the sample period). The results are quite similar.
We report our results using the balanced panel.
In order to determine which model should be used, we perform a specification test
described by Hausman (1978). Under a given specification, the test statistic follows a
chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. Based on a critical value of 5.99 corre-
sponding to a 5% significance level, we can see that the two most restrictive specifications
IV and V, with either only the time effects or firm effects, are strongly rejected.25 The
model specification III, with firm effects and random time effects, is not rejected for the
25We have also performed two F-tests of specifications IV and V against specification I. Both of IV & V are
strongly rejected as well.
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sample period, but it is strongly rejected for the period 1997-2000 with a χ2 = 8.06. This
is to be expected, since Figure 2 shows that the premia vary over time and are auto-
correlated. On the other hand, the model specification II, with time effects and random
firm effects, is not rejected by the data. This implies that, while the time effects are
important for capturing the time-varying average premium in Figure 2, the firm effects
are also present but could be treated as a random error.26 As a result,we can obtain a
consistent estimates of turnover and time effects in a parsimonious model while allowing
cross-sectional variables such as risk and liquidity to influence a firm’s average A-B share
premium through the random firm effects.
Under specification II, we can see that A turnover has a statistically and economically
significant effect on the premia. A one-standard deviation increase in A turnover raises
the A-B premium by 22%. On the other hand, B turnover has an insignificant effect.
Equation (1) suggests that the time effect term, c0t, incorporates the effects of vari-
ables such as Chinese interest rates, world interest rates, and the risk premium from
China’s political risk.27 This suggests that we examine the specification:
c0t = ϑ0 + ϑ1rChina + ϑ2rWorld + ϑ3iChinaSprd.
Intuitively, an increase in Chinese interest rates should lower A-share price due to
an increase in the discount rates. Thus, we would expect ϑ1 to be negative. Also, an
increase in world interest rates should lower B-share prices and thus increasing the A-B
premium ρit . Moreover, an increase in China’s political/sovereign risk, which we proxy
by using the spread between Chinese long-term bond and US 10-year bond (iChinasprd),
should also lower B-share prices.28 This implies that ϑ2 and ϑ3 should be positive. Here
we use the Chinese three-month deposit rate for Chinese risk free rate rChina and US
three-month Treasury bill rate to proxy for world interest rate rWorld. Table 7 presents
26These effects are constant over time but vary randomly across stocks and tend to affect the mean premium
of individual stocks.
27Here we ignore the Chinese as well as the world market equity risk premium, since the ex ante risk premium
is hard to measure.
28Kim and Mei (2001) discover that China’s political risk affect stock prices in Hong Kong. This imply that
political risk could affect B share prices as well, since investors in Hong Kong shares are likely to invest in B
shares as well.
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the results for the time period March 1994-December 2000,29 using c0t estimated from
specification II of our panel regression. The R2 is 85%, ϑ1 and ϑ3 have the right signs and
are highly significant, while ϑ2 has the right sign but is not statistically significant. Hence
the time effect is well described by a combination of Chinese interest rates, world interest
rates and a measure of the political risks, and each of these variables contributes with the
expected sign. This is consistent with the importance of the difference in discount factors
between domestic and foreign investors as emphasized by Fernald and Rogers (2002).
7 The 2001 Relaxation of B-Share Restrictions
On February 28, 2001, Chinese authorities opened the markets for B shares to domestic
investors, provided they used foreign currency. This change allows us to further examine
the behavior of A and B share markets. In addition to documenting the change in the
A-B share premia after the rule change as in other studies, e.g., Karolyi and Li (2003)
and Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2003), we are especially interested in examing whether
the relationship among A-B share premia, share turnover and asset float has changed
after the regulatory shift.
Table 8 reports the market reaction to the change. Panel A shows that from February
16, 2001 to March 9, 2001, A-share prices on average decreased by 0.5%, and the drop is
statistically insignificant with a standard deviation of 22%. On the other hand, B-share
prices increased by 63% on average and the increase is highly significant with a standard
deviation of only 7.3%. Therefore, most price reaction came from B shares. Panel B
shows the change in B share turnover rates around the change in regulation. Before
the event, B shares have an average monthly turnover of 12.3%, while post-event it
becomes 44.4%, which is similar to the A-share turnover rate reported in Table 1. These
observations indicate that after allowing Chinese domestic investors to buy B shares, B
shares turned over faster and prices became higher, behaving more like A shares.
To further investigate the behavior of B-share markets after February 2001, we repeat
the cross-sectional regression of Table 3 (regressing A-B premium to A-share and B-share
29Our sample here is a little short since the Chinese Long-term bond data starts at March 1994.
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turnover) for the period of March 2001 to December 2001. The results are reported in
Part I of Table 9. The coefficient of A-share turnover is still positive and significant, while
the coefficient of B-share turnover becomes negative and also significant, in contrast to
the results for the earlier period shown in Table 3. This suggests that a speculative
component might have appeared in B-share prices after the rule change. These results
are robust even after we control for liquidity by using the proportion of no-price-change
days. In addition, we note that the coefficient of B-share liquidity becomes insignificant,
in contrast to the positive and significant result for the earlier period. This is consistent
with the view that liquidity is no longer a main determinant of B-share prices after a
dramatic increase in the trading volume of B-shares after the liberalization.
Part II of Table 9 repeats the same cross-sectional regression in Table 4 (regressing A
and B-share turnover rates on their float) after the rule change. This time, while the A-
share coefficient remains negative, the B share coefficient turns negative and significant,
which is the opposite of the positive coefficient found for the period before the event as
shown in Table 4.30 As we have discussed earlier, a negative association between turnover
and float supports the view that trading in B-share markets is driven more by speculation
than liquidity reasons after the opening of B-shares markets to local investors. This result
is also consistent with Part I, suggesting a possible speculative component in B-shares
after the rule change.31
8 Conclusion and Further Discussion
By analyzing data on Chinese A-B share premia, we argue that speculative trading can
contribute a significant non-fundamental component to stock prices. Although this is a
special market episode, it displays many common features with the recent Internet bubble
in the US. Our results should help in understanding non-fundamental determinants of
asset prices in other contexts.
30To see whether there is a significant coefficient change post liberalization, Part I & II also provide a simple
t-test by comparing the mean coefficient estimates post liberalization to the same mean estimates before liberal-
ization. The results show that while the coefficient change in A share float is insignificant, the coefficient change
in B share float is highly significant.
31We have also conducted an event study of the change in the A-B share premia across the rule change period.
We find that the change is mostly driven by the B-share turnover
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The determination of stock prices and price volatility in emerging markets has received
considerable attention in the recent economic and finance literature, since it affects the
cost of capital and investment flows in these markets. Previous studies have used cap-
ital controls, information asymmetries, corporate governance, liquidity, as well as price
discrimination to explain price differences between shares that are exclusive to foreign or
domestic investors. Our analysis indicates that speculative trading could also contribute
to explaining this price difference.
The speculative nature of stock prices can also help us comprehend the challenge faced
by many governments in achieving true privatization. It has been widely recognized that
the dominance of state ownership in public companies has been an important contributing
factor to the weakness in their governance,32 since state ownership is often controlled by
bureaucrats who have little incentive to profit maximize and perhaps aim at expropriating
shareholders. While privatization through selling state-shares to the public can improve
governance in the long-run, the increase in share float may temporarily depress share
prices in a speculative market, and creating resistance to reform.
On July 24, 2001, the government approved the listing of four new IPOs with sharply
reduced non-tradable shares, indicating a policy shift aiming at reducing state ownership,
as part of economic reforms. Despite the apparent improvement in governance that such
a policy might bring, the stock markets reacted strongly and negatively, falling by over
20% and eventually causing the government to abandon this policy.33 Although it is
possible that this market reaction reflected the fear of investors that the government
would stop favoring the public companies after it reduced its stake, it seems more likely
that this reaction demonstrates the high sensitivity of stock prices to asset float in China’s
markets. This phenomena mimicks the experience of internet stocks in U.S. markets
between November 1999 and April 2000 when the lockup restrictions on insider selling in
many internet companies expired. During this period, according to Ofek and Richardson
32See, for example, a World Bank report written by Tenev, Zhang and Brefort (2002).
33Specifically, the market index dropped 3.1% the next day. During the next three months, the market index
fell an additional 19.2%. On October 23, 2001, the government announced the postponement of the plans to float
non-tradable shares, and the market index jumped 9.8%. On June 23, 2002, the government further announced
that it would suspend the policy in order to boost investor confidence in the stock markets. The next day, the
market index rose 9.1%.
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(2003), selling by insiders caused a dramatic increase in the asset float of internet stocks,
and may have ultimately led to the crash of internet stocks. This is also consistent with
the theory summarized in Section 3 that the existence of a speculative component in
stock prices makes them very sensitive to asset float.
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A Restrictions in Panel Regressions
To avoid perfect collinearity in the panel regression, we set c01 = 0. While the model
in equation (4) is a reasonable extension to model (2), the downside is that it consumes
many degrees of freedom since we need to estimate each ui individually. We can simplify
this estimation, if we view the firm specific terms as randomly distributed across the cross-
sectional units. More precisely we will assume that the components ui are uncorrelated
and with identical variances, and orthogonal to the regressors. That is,




 , V ar[u
2
i ] = σ
2
u,
Cov[ui, uj] = 0 if i 6= j, (5)
E[ituj] = 0 ∀ i, j, t,
E[itjs] = 0 if t 6= s or i 6= j.
The combination of model (4) and the assumptions in (5) constitutes a random effects
model. By the same token, we may impose the random effects restriction on the time
dimension instead of the cross-sectional dimension. This would imply that c0t varies
randomly over time. Alternatively, we may further simplify model (4) by eliminating
either the time or firm effect.
In order to determine which model should be used, we will perform a specification
test described by Hausman (1978).34 Under the hypothesis given in (5), both the OLS
estimate of (4) and the GLS estimate of the random effect model described in Greene
(2002) are consistent, but OLS is inefficient. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, a test
statistic defined by
W = [c− θ]′Σ−1[c− θ] (6)
should be asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom.35 Here,
c and θ are vector of estimates for c1 and c2 with or without imposing (5), and Σ =
V ar[c− θ] = V ar[c]− V ar[θ].
34See also Wu (1973).
35See Greene (2002) for details.
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Table 1:  Summary statistics for monthly data (A shares)  
 
This table provides summary statistics for all firms that have listed A-shares on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between January 1997 and 
December 2000. Our data includes market capitalization, daily closing prices, monthly 
turnover rates of shares and trading volume, monthly returns (with dividends reinvested), 
and return volatility. We classified G (info tech including telecom and computer), C5, 
C51, C5110, C5115 (electronics), C85, C8501, C8599 (biotech, Pharmersuticals), L20, 
L2001, L2005, L2099 (info services) as high tech, and all others as low tech.  
 
Variables High tech Mean Median Std 
Market Cap (Billion) Yes 3.37 2.39 2.73 
 No 2.96 2.11 3.2 
Price (Yuan) Yes 16.73 15.67 5.04 
 No 12.09 11.97 3.64 
Monthly turnover Yes 0.43 0.43 0.10 
 No 0.39 0.39 0.09 
Volume (Million) Yes 24.17 16.45 20.59 
 No 27.80 21.97 21.62 
Monthly return (%) Yes 1.61 1.79 0.79 
 No 1.07 1.03 0.95 
Monthly volatility (%) Yes 14.39 13.87 2.82 





Table 2: Summary statistics of A-B pairs. 
This table provides summary statistics for all firms that had issued both A-shares and B-
shares between April 1993 and December 2001. There were 75 such firms. The share 
turnover and logarithm of market capitalization are both calculated based on the amount 
of floating shares. 
 





Mean A 0.474 2.1%** 19.63 421.8% 
 B 0.107 14.3% 19.13  
Cross-sectional STD*   A 0.185 3.0% 0.801 167.3% 
 B 0.053 11.8% 0.909  
 
*Time average of cross-sectional standard deviation. 




Table 3. Cross-Sectional Regression of A-B Share Premium  
This table presents a summary of monthly cross-sectional regression of A-B share 
















PP εττρ +++++=−= 43210  
where )1log( Ait
A
it turnover+=τ , )1log( BitBit turnover+=τ , Aisz  is the proportion of 
no-price-change days for the A-shares of firm i in month t, and Bisz  is the proportion of 
no-price-change days for the B-shares of firm i in month t. The coefficients are reported 
by the time-series average of each month’s estimate, and the Fama-MacBeth t-stat is 
computed by 1−T multiplied by the average coefficient and then divided by the time 
series standard deviation of coefficients based on Fama-MacBeth (1973). T is the number 
of time periods. Average Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 for the 
cross-sectional regression over time.  
 
A. Turnover Only (April 1993-Dec.2000) 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 3.442 3.756 1.600   0.255 
FM t-Stat 21.14 6.956 1.190    
Average Marginal R2 - 0.203 0.046    
B. Turnover and No-price-change Days (Jan. 1995-Dec.2000) 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 3.386 4.273 1.834 1.922 3.341 0.270 
FM t-Stat 21.563 6.260 1.231 1.346 6.821  
Average Marginal R2 - 0.157 0.032 0.027 0.044  
C. No-price-change Days Only (Jan. 1995-Dec.2000) 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 4.432   2.033 4.201 0.091 
FM t-Stat 22.52   1.350 7.917  





Table 4. Cross-Sectional Relation between Turnovers and Market 
Capitalization (April 1993-December 2000) 
This table presents monthly cross-sectional regression of both A-share turnovers and B-
share turnovers, )1log( Ait
A
it turnover+=τ and ),1log( BitBit turnover+=τ  onto the 
corresponding market capitalization. Average Coeff. provides the time-series average of 
coefficients and FM t-stat is computed by 1−T *  Average Coeff. divided by the time-
series standard deviation of  coefficients based on Fama-MacBeth (1973). T is the 
number of time periods. Average Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 
for the cross-sectional regression over time. 
 





it MarketCapLog εαατ ++= )( ,10  
 α0t α1t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coeff. 1.338 -0.051 0.125 
FM t-Stat 7.022 -5.260  
 
 





it MarketCapLog εαατ ++= )( ,10  
 α0t α1t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coeff. -0.058 0.006 0.067 







Table 5. Explaining Cross-Sectional Variation of A-B Premium by Turnovers and Market Capitalization 
(April 1993- December 2000) 
 














it turnover+=τ , and ).1log( BitBit turnover+=τ The coefficients are reported by the time-series average of each 
month’s estimate, and the Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by 1−T multiplied by the average coefficient and then divided by the 
time-series standard deviation of coefficients based on Fama-MacBeth (1973). T is the number of time periods. Average Marginal R2 is 
the time-series average of marginal R2 for the cross-sectional regression over time. 
 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t c5t c6t c7t c8t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 27.83 2.145 5.105 -1.034 -0.195     0.509 
FM t-Stat 14.67 6.367 3.500 -11.02 -5.084      
Average Marginal R2 - 0.127 0.068 0.255 0.065      
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t c5t c6t c7t c8t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 20.759 2.060 5.532 -0.600 -0.232 23.420 -36.34 9.079 0.021 0.503 
FM t-Stat 11.816 6.195 4.669 -7.954 -6.246 3.000 -12.24 2.637 0.968  




Table 6. Specification Test for Pooled Time-series and Cross-Sectional 












PP εττρ ++++=−= 210  
  c1 C2 Adjusted R2 
Coeff. 1.608 -1.108 0.797 I. Time effects and firm 
effects t-Stat 9.989 -1.701  
     
Coeff. 1.631 -1.085 -* II. Time effects and 
random firm effects t-Stat 10.04 -1.651  
 Economic Significance 0.22 0.04  
 Specification Test against A: χ2= 1.46 Not Rejected 
     
Coeff. 1.564 -1.082 -* III. Firm effects and 
random time effects t-Stat 9.592 -1.638  
 Specification Test against A:  χ2= 3.23 Not Rejected** 
     
Coeff. 2.756 0.168 0.590 IV. Time effects only 
t-Stat 12.62 0.187  
 Specification Test against B: χ2= 76.3 Rejected 
     
V. Firm effects only Coeff. -0.019 0.681 0.229 
 t-Stat -0.087 0.717  
 Specification Test against C: χ2= 117.4 Rejected 
Note: Specifications I-V are estimated based on a balanced panel of 28 stocks with no missing 
data from 4/1993-12/2000. Specification VI is estimated based on an unbalanced panel of 73 
stocks with missing data from 4/1993-12/2000.  
 
* Adjusted R2 not reported due to the use of generalized least squares. 
 










Table 7. Explaining the Time Variation of tc0  
(March 1994-December 2000) 
This table presents the following time-series regression tc0   
 
tChinaSprdworldChinat irrc ηϑϑϑϑ ++++= 32100  
 
where tc0  is the time-effect coefficient from the panel regression in Table 7 (specification 
II) of A-B share premium on A and B share turnovers, Chinar  is the Chinese 3-month 
deposit rate, worldr  is the U.S. 3-month treasury rate, and ChinaSprdi  is the spread between 
Chinese long-term bond and U.S. 10-year treasury bond. The t-statistics are computed 
using Newey-West autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with 6 lags.   
 
 0ϑ  1ϑ  2ϑ  3ϑ  Adj. R2 
Coefficient -1.866 -0.683 0.187 2.473 0.851 
t-Stat -1.355 -11.02 1.020 9.806  
 
Table 8. Market Reactions to the Event of Opening B Shares to 
Domestic Investors in February 2001 
This table presents a summary of market reactions of the opening of B shares to Chinese 
domestic investors in February 28, 2001.  
 
A. Price reactions (2/16/2001 – 3/09/2001) 
 N Mean STD 
A share price changes  73 -0.5% 22% 
B share price changes 73 63% 7.3% 
 
B. Changes in monthly turnover of B shares (6 months before and after) 
 N Mean Median STD 
Pre-event turnover 73 12.3% 10.5% 7.7% 
Post-event turnover 73 44.4% 44.7% 15.8% 





Table 9. Regression Results after the Opening of B shares 
(March 2001-December 2001) 
This table presents a summary of several cross-sectional regressions for the period after 
the opening of B-shares. 
 
















PP εττρ +++++=−= 43210  
where )1log( Ait
A
it turnover+=τ , )1log( BitBit turnover+=τ , Aisz  is the proportion of 
no-price-change days for the A-shares of firm i in month t, and Bisz  is the proportion of 
no-price-change days for the B-shares of firm i in month t. The coefficients are reported 
by the time-series average of each month’s estimate, and the Fama-MacBeth t-stat is 
computed by 1−T multiplied by the average coefficient and then divided by the time-
series standard deviation of coefficients based on Fama-MacBeth (1973). T is the number 
of time periods. Average Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 for the 
cross-sectional regression over time.  
A. Turnover Only 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 1.974 0.402 -0.427   0.086 
FM t-Stat 18.66 2.614 -2.229    
Average Marginal R2 - 0.053 0.065    
T-test of Sig. Change 7.560 5.974 1.493    
B. Turnover and No Price Change Days 
 C0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 2.010 0.383 -0.408 -0.754 -0.495 0.106 
FM t-Stat 19.02 2.456 -2.121 -1.725 -0.577  
Average Marginal R2 - 0.052 0.062 0.010 0.014  
T-test of Sig. Change 7.270 5.556 1.492 1.792 3.883  
C. No Price Change Days Only 
 c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj.R2 
Average Coefficient 1.929   -0.957 -0.818 0.026 
FM t-Stat 34.79   -2.936 -0.947  
Average Marginal R2 -   0.009 0.018  




 Part II. Cross-Sectional Relation between Turnovers and Market Capitalization 
 





it MarketCapLog εαατ ++= − )( 1,10  
 α0t α1t Average Adj. R2 
Average Coefficient 1.602 -0.068 0.138 
FM t-Stat 3.378 -3.100  
T-test of Sig. Change -0.517 0.709  
 





it MarketCapLog εαατ ++= − )( 1,10  
 α0t α1t Average Adj. R2 
Average Coefficient 0.758 -0.021 0.020 
FM t-Stat 5.410 -5.807  
T-test of Sig. Change -5.603 6.507  
 
Note: T-test of Sig. Change is a test of significant coefficient change post liberalization 









































































































Figure 3B: Time Series of Cross-Sectional Variation of Monthly Turnover Rates for 



























































Figure 4: Cross-sectional Standard Deviation of Price Premium over Time and the Variation Explained by the Following 




































































Figure 5A: Time Series of Average Percentage of No-Price-Change Dates in a 




















































Figure 5B: Time Series of Cross-Sectional Variation of Percentage of No-Price-
Change Dates in a Month for A & B Shares 
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